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Husserl Studies

, Volume 29, Issue 1, pp 65–77 | Cite as

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  • Walter Hopp
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I would like to thank Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl and Søren Overgaard for their penetrating and challenging criticisms of my book, Perception and Knowledge (henceforth “PK”). What follows are responses to some, though by no means all, of the critical points each raises.

Reply to Rinofner-Kreidl

Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl’s rich critique centers largely around three related issues: the instantiation model of the intentional act advocated in PK, achieving a proper understanding of the transparency of experience, and determining just what sort of threat skepticism poses. Rinofner-Kreidl’s discussion is guided throughout by due attention to the PR-distinction—that is, the distinction between naively undergoing an experience and reflecting upon it—and by a keen eye for assertions, on my part, that flout phenomenology’s methodological imperative to consult the matters themselves.

On the view I defend in PK, intentional contents are those entities in virtue of which intentional experiences represent...

Keywords

Perceptual Experience Worldly Object Intentional Object Intentional Content Intentional Property 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyBoston UniversityBostonUSA

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