Husserl Studies

, Volume 29, Issue 1, pp 1–12 | Cite as

On Necessarily True Propositions

  • José Ruiz Fernández


The main goal of this paper is to reflect on what characterizes the evidence of the propositions that we hold to be necessary. I have tried to show that the evidence of every necessarily true proposition takes the form of a self-contained operational composition. In conclusion, I will point out in what respects the view I defend might help to reconcile some traits of Husserl’s understanding of material a priori truth with some of the later Wittgenstein’s intuitions concerning linguistic meaning.


Operational Composition True Proposition Linguistic Meaning Technical Definition Operational Construction 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


  1. Benoist, J. (1999). L’a priori conceptual. Bolzano, Husserl, Schlick. Paris, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin.Google Scholar
  2. Benoist, J. (2008). Grammatik und Intentionalität (IV Logische Untersuchung). In Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, Klassiker Auslegen, Bd. 35, Berlin, Akademie Verlag.Google Scholar
  3. Drury, M. (1981). Conversations with Wittgenstein. In R. Rhees (Ed.), Personal recollections of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
  4. Husserl, E. (1980). Experiencia y Juicio. UNAM: México.Google Scholar
  5. Hua XIX/2. Husserl, E. Logische Untersuchungen Zweiter Band, Zweiter Teil. Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis. U. Panzer (Ed.), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984.Google Scholar
  6. Majolino, C. (2002). Book Review: L’a priori conceptuel: Bolzano, Husserl, Schlick. Husserl Studies 18.Google Scholar
  7. Quine, W. V. (1953). Two dogmas of empiricism. In A. P. Martinich (Ed.), The philosophy of language (3ª ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  8. Schlick, M. (1938). Gibt es ein materiales A priori? Gesammelte Aufsätze 1926–1936. Vienna: Hindelsheim.Google Scholar
  9. Spiegelberg, H. (1994). The puzzle of Wittgenstein’s Phänomenologie (1929-?). In The context of the phenomenological movement. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.Google Scholar
  10. Tugendhat, E. (1982). Traditional and analytical philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  11. Wittgenstein, L. (1967). Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis. In Wittgenstein Schriften, Bd. 3, Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main.Google Scholar
  12. Wittgenstein, L. (1978). Philosophical investigations. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
  13. Wittgenstein, L. (2005). The big typescript: TS 213. Oxford: Blackwell.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Zhang, W. (2011). Gibt es ein materiales Apriori? In A. T. Tymieniecka (Ed.), Analecta Husserliana CX, part I (pp. 123–138). Dordrecht: Springer.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Facultad de FilosofiaUniversidad Complutense de MadridMadridSpain

Personalised recommendations