Abstract
The main goal of this paper is to reflect on what characterizes the evidence of the propositions that we hold to be necessary. I have tried to show that the evidence of every necessarily true proposition takes the form of a self-contained operational composition. In conclusion, I will point out in what respects the view I defend might help to reconcile some traits of Husserl’s understanding of material a priori truth with some of the later Wittgenstein’s intuitions concerning linguistic meaning.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Similarly, the evidence that bachelors are necessarily unmarried has got nothing to do with empirical research that would support the fact that English speakers use the expressions “bachelors” and “unmarried” as synonyms. If by sameness of meaning we understand a relationship in the empirical use of two expressions, a sameness of meaning between “bachelor” and “unmarried” cannot be ascertained (Quine 1953, pp. 39–52). We are justified to assert something like “bachelors are unmarried” because, and as long as, with those words we are asserting that proposition whose truth is recognized in the evidence that to something we meaningfully deal with (“bachelors”) something we mean is inherent (“being unmarried”). The proposition that we assert is true because that precise proposition is what we are evidencing. Evidence is the awareness of the truth of a certain proposition. But this means: once we have evidence of a proposition, asking for a further ground of the truth of that proposition makes no sense.
Schlick’s critique is found in his Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre (1918), and in a different form in the second edition of 1925. He also wrote a later article on the matter (Cf. Schlick 1938).
Cf. Tugendhat 1982, p. 49.
To see an example, not dealing with colors but with sounds, see Husserl 1980, pp. 415–416.
In Logical Investigations Husserl says: “On the basis of primary intuitions [ideating] abstraction comes into play.” And he continues that “the consciousness of the universal builds equally well on the ground of perception as on that of the corresponding imagination, and once built, we aprehend […] the universal itself” (Hua XIX/2, pp. 690–691). In Experience and Judgement this is assumed within a constitutive framework dependent on passive synthesis, but the view remains unaltered: “on the ground of the open process of variation […] is founded, in a superior level, the authentic contemplation of the universal as eidos. […] In this transition […] the arbitrary particularities […] in the sequence of their appearances come to shape in a purely passive manner a synthetic unity […] in which the universal itself is particularized as eidos” (Husserl 1980, p. 379).
To my knowledge the best critique of Husserl’s objective conception of meaning can be found in Tugendhat 1982, pp. 121ff., 227ff.
The protocol of the conversation is under the title “Anti-Husserl” (Wittgenstein 1967, pp. 63 ff).
Grammar, says Wittgenstein, “does not say how a language must be constructed in order to attain its purpose […] it only describes the use of signs” (Wittgenstein 1978, §496).
It has been recently maintained (Cf. Benoist 1999, 2008) that the foundation of Husserl’s material a priori should be linked not only to the intuition of particulars, but also to this pure grammar. Supposedly, the phenomenological material a priori would thus be also determined by our language. It has been claimed that this interpretation of Husserl is forced, and that it brings Husserl close to the reasoning of the later Wittgenstein (Cf. Majolino 2002; Zhang 2011). I would agree with the first part of the claim but not the second. Husserl’s programmatic pure grammar aims to state the a priori forms of meaning, understood as a particular material region. This pure semantic is thus sketched within an objective conception of meaning. What Wittgenstein is emphasizing has nothing to do with this program. He is not saying that there are essential a priori forms of what is meant, but that meaning as such is not something intentionally exhibited but more like rule following or use.
Wittgenstein 2005, p. 320.
Wittgenstein clearly states that “following a rule” is not in itself something empirical (Wittgenstein 2005, pp. 189–194).
Anastasiya Shpakovska translated a first draft of the paper that I had written in Spanish. I would like to thank her for her competent work and generous availability.
References
Benoist, J. (1999). L’a priori conceptual. Bolzano, Husserl, Schlick. Paris, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin.
Benoist, J. (2008). Grammatik und Intentionalität (IV Logische Untersuchung). In Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, Klassiker Auslegen, Bd. 35, Berlin, Akademie Verlag.
Drury, M. (1981). Conversations with Wittgenstein. In R. Rhees (Ed.), Personal recollections of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Oxford: Blackwell.
Husserl, E. (1980). Experiencia y Juicio. UNAM: México.
Hua XIX/2. Husserl, E. Logische Untersuchungen Zweiter Band, Zweiter Teil. Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis. U. Panzer (Ed.), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984.
Majolino, C. (2002). Book Review: L’a priori conceptuel: Bolzano, Husserl, Schlick. Husserl Studies 18.
Quine, W. V. (1953). Two dogmas of empiricism. In A. P. Martinich (Ed.), The philosophy of language (3ª ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schlick, M. (1938). Gibt es ein materiales A priori? Gesammelte Aufsätze 1926–1936. Vienna: Hindelsheim.
Spiegelberg, H. (1994). The puzzle of Wittgenstein’s Phänomenologie (1929-?). In The context of the phenomenological movement. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Tugendhat, E. (1982). Traditional and analytical philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wittgenstein, L. (1967). Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis. In Wittgenstein Schriften, Bd. 3, Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main.
Wittgenstein, L. (1978). Philosophical investigations. Oxford: Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L. (2005). The big typescript: TS 213. Oxford: Blackwell.
Zhang, W. (2011). Gibt es ein materiales Apriori? In A. T. Tymieniecka (Ed.), Analecta Husserliana CX, part I (pp. 123–138). Dordrecht: Springer.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Ruiz Fernández, J. On Necessarily True Propositions. Husserl Stud 29, 1–12 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-012-9118-1
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-012-9118-1