Group Decision and Negotiation

, Volume 13, Issue 6, pp 513–538 | Cite as

A Multi-Agent Coalition Formation Method Based on Preference Models

  • Samir Aknine
  • Suzanne Pinson
  • Melvin F. Shakun


Coordination is one of the fundamental research issues in distributed artificial intelligence and multi-agent systems. Current multi-agent coalition formation methods present two major problems. First, some of these methods can be applied only to cooperative multi-agent systems; second, the algorithms proposed may fail in the formation of the coalitions. This article proposes two methods for problems of agent coalition formation in cooperative and non-cooperative multi-agent systems. These methods are based on agent preference models and on preference aggregation using the Choquet integral. Our first method based on the evolutionary system design (ESD) methodology proposed by M. Shakun is required for competitive multi-agent systems, whereas our second method is powerful for cooperative multi-agent systems where the agents can exchange their information.


Artificial Intelligence System Design Evolutionary System Formation Method Research Issue 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Samir Aknine
    • 1
  • Suzanne Pinson
    • 2
  • Melvin F. Shakun
    • 3
  1. 1.LIP6Université Paris 6Paris Cedex 15France
  2. 2.LAMSADEUniversité Paris DauphineParis Cedex 16France
  3. 3.Leonard, N. Stern School of BusinessNew York UniversityNew YorkUSA

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