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Formal Methods in System Design

, Volume 40, Issue 1, pp 88–115 | Cite as

Synthesis of opaque systems with static and dynamic masks

  • Franck Cassez
  • Jérémy Dubreil
  • Hervé Marchand
Article

Abstract

Opacity is a security property formalizing the absence of secret information leakage and we address in this paper the problem of synthesizing opaque systems. A secret predicate S over the runs of a system G is opaque to an external user having partial observability over G, if s/he can never infer from the observation of a run of G that the run belongs to S. We choose to control the observability of events by adding a device, called a mask, between the system G and the users. We first investigate the case of static partial observability where the set of events the user can observe is fixed a priori by a static mask. In this context, we show that checking whether a system is opaque is PSPACE-complete, which implies that computing an optimal static mask ensuring opacity is also a PSPACE-complete problem. Next, we introduce dynamic partial observability where the set of events the user can observe changes over time and is chosen by a dynamic mask. We show how to check that a system is opaque w.r.t. to a dynamic mask and also address the corresponding synthesis problem: given a system G and secret states S, compute the set of dynamic masks under which S is opaque. Our main result is that the set of such masks can be finitely represented and can be computed in EXPTIME and this is a lower bound. Finally we also address the problem of computing an optimal mask.

Keywords

Security Confidentiality property Opacity Synthesis Dynamic observation 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Franck Cassez
    • 1
  • Jérémy Dubreil
    • 2
  • Hervé Marchand
    • 3
  1. 1.CNRSNational ICT AustraliaSydneyAustralia
  2. 2.ComèteINRIA and Ecole PolytechniquePalaiseauFrance
  3. 3.VerTeCs, INRIACentre Rennes–Bretagne AtlantiqueRennesFrance

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