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Foundations of Physics

, Volume 45, Issue 9, pp 1101–1109 | Cite as

Turning Norton’s Dome Against Material Induction

  • Richard DawidEmail author
Article
  • 137 Downloads

Abstract

John Norton has proposed a position of “material induction” that denies the existence of a universal inductive inference schema behind scientific reasoning. In this vein, Norton has recently presented a “dome scenario” based on Newtonian physics that, in his understanding, is at variance with Bayesianism. The present note points out that a closer analysis of the dome scenario reveals incompatibilities with material inductivism itself.

Keywords

Material induction Norton’s dome Induction 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.LMU MunichMunichGermany

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