Foundations of Science

, Volume 20, Issue 2, pp 135–145 | Cite as

Present Time

  • Gustavo E. Romero


The idea of a moving present or ‘now’ seems to form part of our most basic beliefs about reality. Such a present, however, is not reflected in any of our theories of the physical world. I show in this article that presentism, the doctrine that only what is present exists, is in conflict with modern relativistic cosmology and recent advances in neurosciences. I argue for a tenseless view of time, where what we call ‘the present’ is just an emergent secondary quality arising from the interaction of perceiving self-conscious individuals with their environment. I maintain that there is no flow of time, but just an ordered system of events.


Ontology Space–time General relativity Quantum mechanics 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Instituto Argentino de Radioastronomía (IAR), CCT La Plata, CONICETBuenos AiresArgentina

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