Foundations of Science

, Volume 17, Issue 4, pp 321–337 | Cite as

Abduction and Estimation in Animals

  • Woosuk Park


One of the most pressing issues in understanding abduction is whether it is an instinct or an inference. For many commentators find it paradoxical that new ideas are products of an instinct and products of an inference at the same time. Fortunately, Lorenzo Magnani’s recent discussion of animal abduction sheds light on both instinctual and inferential character of Peircean abduction. But, exactly for what reasons are Peirce and Magnani so convinced that animal abduction can provide us with a novel perspective? Inspired by Peirce’s and Magnani’s discussions of animal abduction, I propose to compare Peirce’s and Magnani’s views of animal abduction with the estimative power of non-human animals and humans, which was one of the internal senses in medieval psychology.


Animal abduction Estimation Charles S. Peirce Avicenna Lorenzo Magnani Instinct Inference 


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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Humanities and Social SciencesKorea Advanced Institute of Science and TechnologyDaejeonSouth Korea

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