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The Depositor Behind the Discipline: A Micro-Level Case Study of Hamilton Bank

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Abstract

Though uninsured depositors are recognized as a source of market discipline, the possible disciplinary effect of decisions made by fully insured depositors have gone largely unexamined. Using proprietary administrative deposit data at the account level, this paper analyzes depositor behavior at a recently failed institution. The results suggest that although uninsured deposits exited at a greater rate than insured deposits, the vast majority of deposits withdrawn were fully insured. Among types of deposit accounts, the rates of withdrawal for fully insured individual, joint, and trust accounts were relatively high. Uninsured business account owners were highly sensitive to the bank's deteriorating condition. In contrast, owners of uninsured individual retirement accounts effectively exerted no market discipline.

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The opinions expressed in this paper are ours and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. All errors are our own.

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Davenport, A.M., McDill, K.M. The Depositor Behind the Discipline: A Micro-Level Case Study of Hamilton Bank. J Finan Serv Res 30, 93–109 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10693-006-8741-4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10693-006-8741-4

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