Institution design and public good provision: an experimental study of the vote of confidence procedure
Parliamentary democracies use the vote of confidence procedure, which links the survival of a government with that of a bill, in order to discipline members of the majority. In this paper I investigate the role that the vote of confidence procedure has on public good provision and show that it has unintended negative consequences: even when efficient, public goods may be turned down in favor of earmarked projects. I use a laboratory experiment to test my model and show that the increase in voting cohesion comes at the cost of a 23 % reduction in public good provision and more unequal earmarking.
KeywordsMultilateral legislative bargaining Vote of confidence procedure Proposer power
I would like to thank Alessandro Lizzeri for suggesting the topic and Guillaume Frechette for guidance. In addition, I am grateful to Marina Agranov, Theo Ofermann, Andrew Schotter, Lise Vesterlundt and the participants at the ESA North American Meetings for helpful comments.
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