Abstract
In this article I respond to comments and objections raised in the special issue on my book The Dimensions of Consequentialism. I defend my multi-dimensional consequentialist theory against a range of challenges articulated by Thomas Schmidt, Campbell Brown, Frances Howard-Snyder, Roger Crisp, Vuko Andric and Attila Tanyi, and Jan Gertken. My aim is to show that multi-dimensional consequentialism is, at least, a coherent and intuitively plausible alternative to one-dimensional theories such as utilitarianism, prioritarianism, and mainstream accounts of egalitarianism. I am very grateful to all contributors for reading my book so closely and for devoting time and intellectual energy to thinking about the pros and cons of multi-dimensional consequentialism.
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Notes
I distinguish between ‘aspects’ and ‘dimensions’. A dimension is the conceptual space in which an aspect can vary. For instance, the area of a circle depends on only one aspect (its radius) whereas the area of a triangle depends on two aspects (its base and height). All three aspects are elements of the same dimension (length), but the length and mass of a tennis ball are different aspects which are also elements of different dimensions.
This example is similar to the one I give in Chapter 1.
Naturally, the prioritarian verdict will depend on the shape of the (concave) priority function.
The technical aspects of multi-dimensional consequentialism can be developed in a number of ways. I discuss three proposals in the appendix to The Dimensions of Consequentialism.
See the appendix to The Dimensions of Consequentialism for a discussion of this numerical representation of degrees of rightness.
Brown uses the term value pluralism. The distinction between value pluralism and multi-dimensional consequentialism is discussed in Chapter 1 of The Dimensions of Consequentialism.
Note that this literal interpretation of Mill presupposes a ratio measure of happiness.
See the first paragraph of Section 2 in his article.
See Chapter 6 of The Dimensions of Consequentialism.
Brown, this issue.
Op. cit.
Op. cit.
Andric and Tanyi, this issue
The only exception is their analysis of the Jackson case, as I explain below.
Andric and Tanyi, this issue.
References
Levi, I. (1989) ‘Rationality, Prediction, and Autonomous Choice’, Can J Philo 19 (Suppl), 339–362. Reprinted in Levi, I. (1997): The Covenant of Reason, Cambridge University Press.
Mill JS (1861/1969) Collected works of John Stuart Mill. University of Toronto Press, Toronto.
Peterson M (2006) ‘Indeterminate preferences’, Philos Stud 130(2):297–320.
Peterson M (2008) Non-bayesian decision theory. Springer.
Peterson M (2013) The dimensions of consequentialism. Cambridge University Press.
Spohn W (1977) ‘Where Luce and Krantz do really generalize Savage’s decision model’, Erkenntnis 11:113–134.
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Peterson, M. The Dimensions of Consequentialism: Reply to Schmidt, Brown, Howard-Snyder, Crisp, Andric and Tanyi, and Gertken. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 19, 71–82 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-015-9662-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-015-9662-9