Abstract
In this paper, I present and defend a novel version of the Reactive Attitude account of moral blameworthiness. In Section 1, I introduce the Reactive Attitude account and outline Allan Gibbard’s version of it. In Section 2, I present the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem, which has been at the heart of much recent discussion about the nature of value, and explain why a reformulation of it causes serious problems for versions of the Reactive Attitude account such as Gibbard’s. In Section 3, I consider some ways in which Gibbard might attempt to avoid the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem. I argue that all of these ways fail to achieve their aim and further contend that the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem cannot be solved in a sufficiently convincing manner by the widely used method of making ad hoc distinctions among kinds of properties, kinds of attitudes, and kinds of reasons. In Section 4, I sketch my own version of the Reactive Attitude account of moral blameworthiness and show that it simply avoids the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem rather than attempting to solve the problem on a piecemeal basis.
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Notes
Especially, Analysis, Ethics, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, and Philosophical Quarterly.
A very partial list of works relevant to this topic includes Scanlon (1998: esp., Chapter 2, 2002), Crisp (1999, 2000, 2005, 2006, 2008), Dancy (2000a, 2000b, 2004: Chapter 9 - 12), D’Arms and Jacobson (2000), Parfit (2001a, Forthcoming), Zimmerman (2001, 2007), Wallace (2002), Stratton-Lake (2003a, 2003b, 2005), Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2004, 2005), Olson (2004, 2006), Suikkanen (2005), Heuer (2006), Stratton-Lake and Hooker (2006), Vayrynen (2006), Danielsson and Olson (2007), Skorupski (2007), Brannmark (2008), Rønnow-Rasmussen (2008). Ewing (1947: Chapter 5) is often taken as a precursor of this view. Korsgaard (1983) and Lemos (1994) are also useful.
On reflection, the relevance of the Wrong Kind of Reason problem to the RA account should not be a surprise. This style of objection in which an unlikely confluence of events gives rise to justification, a practical reason, etc., is, of course, often the bane of bi-conditional analyses. One need only think of the classic paper by Gettier (1963) in which Ayer’s analysis of knowledge is foiled because both job candidates, Smith and Jones, just happen to have the same number of coins in their pockets. Among those who see the relevance of the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem for Gibbard, D’Arms and Jacobson (2000) are notable for the depth of their insights.
In what follows, I focus on false negative cases. However, I turn to false positive cases in Section 4.
In this passage, Gibbard is primarily concerned with moral wrongness, rather than moral blameworthiness. However, following Gibbard on this point would make the discussion much more complicated without adding any value. Nothing critical turns my on refocusing the passage moral blameworthiness.
Gibbard sometimes speaks of anger where resentment seems more appropriate.
The tracking metaphor is my own, not Gibbard’s. However, I was thinking here of a kind of analogy of the epistemology of Robert Nozick (1983).
It is worth noting that others have attempted to use a double-tracking solution as a response to something similar to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem in the literature on rational irrationality. See Kavka (1983) and Parfit (1984, 2001a). However, more recent work (2011b) as well as personal correspondence suggests that Parfit might have given up on it.
To the best of my knowledge, the demon was first introduced into this literature by Crisp (1999).
I am assuming for the purpose of this example that the proper domain of agents for whom it ought to make sense to feel resentment is Cleopatra’s court. As already noted, Gibbard is quite vague about the proper domain, but this fact does not have any relevance here since whatever the proper domain D is, we can always imagine that the demon’s threat extends to all members of D.
Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2004).
In explaining why this is so, I focus on Cleopatra and guilt in order to keep the discussion manageable, but essentially the same points can be made about the other members of her court and resentment.
As per Frankfurt (1971).
In order to prevent the cases from getting out of hand, I won’t assign this modification of the circumstances a separate case number. However, readers who wish to pick it out for discussion might refer to it as Case 3*.
We can safely ignore the non-identity problem for the purposes of this thought experiment.
In the rest of this paper, I take it as a given that Gibbard’s version of the RA account has been shown to be false by the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem.
I borrow talk of conforming to reasons from Raz (2009), though I do not wish to imply that he would agree with the way in which I develop this idea.
One astute observer pointed out that in Case 5 it seems like I am endorsing the moral permissibility of capital punishment! However, that is not my intention, and this is simply an artifact of Gibbard’s original example. Changing the case to avoid this artifact would be too tedious to warrant doing so in these circumstances.
Certainly, it might provide me with reason to feel other emotions, including shame, embarrassment, or disappointment. But none of this provides the resources needed for generating a counterexample to my version of the RA account.
Again, the specifics of this example are not very important. Some hold a normative theory in which it is always wrong to break one’s promise. The illustration which I offer here will not convince such a person. But she is free to imagine another set of circumstances in which there are morally salient reasons both for and against doing a certain action even though the balance of reasons clearly tips in one direction or the other.
I am grateful to audience members at a talk given at the University of Reading, the Universityof Calgary, and the City University of New York (Lehman College) among other places for the their insightful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
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Kahn, L. Moral Blameworthiness and the Reactive Attitudes. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 14, 131–142 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-010-9249-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-010-9249-4