Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

, Volume 14, Issue 2, pp 143–149 | Cite as

Pleasure, Desire and Practical Reason

  • James Lenman


This paper examines the role of stability in the constitution of pleasure and desire, its relevance to the intimate ways the two are related and to their role in the constitution of practical reason.


Pleasure Desire Reason Stability 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of SheffieldSheffieldUK

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