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Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

, Volume 10, Issue 3, pp 297–308 | Cite as

Ethical Theory, Completeness & Consistency

  • Andrew Moore
Article

Abstract

This paper argues that many leading ethical theories are incomplete, in that they fail to account for both right and wrong. It also argues that some leading ethical theories are inconsistent, in that they allow that an act can be both right and wrong. The paper also considers responses on behalf of the target theories.

Keywords

Ethics Morality Inconsistency Incompleteness Euthyphro 

Notes

Acknowledgement

I thank those who commented on ancestors of this paper at the following meetings: ‘Virtue theory: old & new’ conference, Christchurch, June 2002; American Philosophical Association (Western Division), San Francisco, March 2003; Philosophy Department seminar, University of Hawaii, March 2003; Australasian Association of Philosophy conference, South Molle Island, July 2004; Joint Session conference, Kent, July 2004; Philosophy Department seminars, University of Otago, August 2004, May 2006; and British Society for Ethical Theory, Southampton, July 2006. My particular thanks to: Stephen Gardiner, Sean McAleer, Roy Perrett, Kent Hurtig, Jonas Olson, Elinor Mason, Garrett Cullity, Tim Mulgan, Martin Wilkinson and Brad Hooker.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of OtagoDunedinNew Zealand

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