Abstract
David K. Chan wants to save the DDE from the considerable criticism levelled against it, by making the moral distinction it refers to rest on a difference in desire instead of in intention. I argue that the revised version, too, is counter-intuitive and confuses the blameworthiness of an actor with the wrongness of the act. It also invites abuse instead of preventing it. Besides, Chan's DDE omits three of the four criteria of the traditional DDE, and it is couched in terms of lesser objectionability, while the traditional DDE is couched in terms of permission. Therefore, Chan's DDE has so little in common with the traditional DDE that it should not even count as a revised version of it.
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References
Bennett, J., Morality and Consequences, in St. M. McMurrin (ed.), The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Vol. II. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1980, pp. 45–116.
Chan, D.K., Intention and Responsibility in Double Effect Cases, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 3 (2000), pp. 405–435.
Thomson, J.J., Self-Defense, Philosophy & Public Affairs 20 (1991), pp. 283–310.
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Steinhoff, U. Yet Another Revised DDE? A Note on David K. Chan's DDEd . Ethic Theory Moral Prac 9, 231–236 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-005-9002-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-005-9002-6