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Ethics and Information Technology

, Volume 13, Issue 1, pp 5–15 | Cite as

Studying the ethical implications of e-trust in the lab

  • Cristina Bicchieri
  • Azi Lev-On
Original Paper

Abstract

The paper presents results of recent laboratory experiments that study if and how computer-mediated communication affects cooperation and trust. It is argued that communication medium does not matter much for trust-building and maintenance, whereas relevant pre-play communication and group size can have a major influence. The implications of the findings for the design of sites that depend on trusting communities are discussed.

Keywords

Trust Promise-keeping Social norms e-trust Communication Trust games 

Notes

Acknowledgment

Authors wish to thank three anonymous referees for several useful comments and insights.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of PennsylvaniaPhiladelphiaUSA
  2. 2.Institute for Research in the Social SciencesStanford UniversityStanfordUSA
  3. 3.School of CommunicationAriel University CenterArielIsrael

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