, Volume 83, Issue 1, pp 61–87 | Cite as

Freedom and the Phenomenology of Agency

  • Martine Nida-Rümelin
Original Research


Free action and microphysical determination are incompatible but this is so only in virtue of a genuine conflict between microphysical determination with any active behavior. I introduce active behavior as the veridicality condition of agentive experiences (of oneself as active) and of perceptual experiences (of others as active) and argue that these veridicality conditions (a) are fulfilled in many everyday cases of human and non-human behavior and that they (b) imply the incompatibility of active behavior with microphysical determination. The main purpose of the paper is to show that the view proposed about active behavior leads to a natural compromise between libertarianism and compatibilism, which avoids the flaws of both positions while preserving their central insights.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Université de FribourgFribourgSwitzerland

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