, Volume 80, Issue 4, pp 853–868 | Cite as

Immodest and Proud

  • Jonathan Tallant
Original Article


In his ‘Ambitious, Yet Modest, Metaphysics’, Hofweber (Metametaphysics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 260–289, 2009a) puts forward arguments against positions in metaphysics that he describes as ‘immodest’; a position he identifies as defended by Jonathan Lowe. In this paper I reply to Hofweber’s arguments, offering a defence of immodest metaphysics of the type practiced by Lowe (The possibility of metaphysics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998) inter alia.


Ontological Commitment Composite Object Metaphysical Theory Metaphysical Question Inferential Role 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of NottinghamNottinghamUK

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