, Volume 80, Issue 4, pp 841–852 | Cite as

Holes Cannot Be Counted as Immaterial Objects

  • Phillip John Meadows
Original Article


In this paper I argue that the theory that holes are immaterial objects faces an objection that has traditionally been thought to be the principal difficulty with its main rival, which construes holes as material parts of material objects. Consequently, one of the principal advantages of identifying holes with immaterial objects is illusory: its apparent ease of accounting for truths about number of holes. I argue that in spite of this we should not think of holes as material parts of material objects. This is because the theory that holes are properties does not face the same difficulties as either of these theories that construe holes as objects of some sort.


Immaterial Object Material Object Common Part Plausible Candidate Complete Filler 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.The University of ManchesterManchesterUK

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