# Generalized Conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty Problem, II

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## Abstract

In “Generalized Conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty Problem,” Anna Mahtani and I offer a new argument for thirdism that relies on what we call “generalized conditionalization.” Generalized conditionalization goes beyond conventional conditionalization in two respects: first, by sometimes deploying a space of synchronic, essentially temporal, candidate-possibilities that are not “prior” possibilities; and second, by allowing for the use of preliminary probabilities that arise by first bracketing, and then conditionalizing upon, “old evidence.” In “Beauty and Conditionalization: Reply to Horgan and Mahtani,” Joel Pust replies to the Horgan/Mahtani argument, raising several objections. In my view his objections do not undermine the argument, but they do reveal a need to provide several further elaborations of it—elaborations that I think are independently plausible. In this paper I will address his objections, by providing the elaborations that I think they prompt.

## Keywords

Preliminary Probability Intermediate Cell Generalize Conditionalization Epistemic Situation Epistemic Probability## Notes

### Acknowledgments

For helpful comments and/discussion, I thank Don Fallis, Richard Healey, Chris Howard, Justin Lillge, Mark Timmons, Alex von Stein, Sarah Wright, and especially Joel Pust.

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