, Volume 80, Issue 4, pp 811–839 | Cite as

Generalized Conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty Problem, II

Original Article


In “Generalized Conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty Problem,” Anna Mahtani and I offer a new argument for thirdism that relies on what we call “generalized conditionalization.” Generalized conditionalization goes beyond conventional conditionalization in two respects: first, by sometimes deploying a space of synchronic, essentially temporal, candidate-possibilities that are not “prior” possibilities; and second, by allowing for the use of preliminary probabilities that arise by first bracketing, and then conditionalizing upon, “old evidence.” In “Beauty and Conditionalization: Reply to Horgan and Mahtani,” Joel Pust replies to the Horgan/Mahtani argument, raising several objections. In my view his objections do not undermine the argument, but they do reveal a need to provide several further elaborations of it—elaborations that I think are independently plausible. In this paper I will address his objections, by providing the elaborations that I think they prompt.


Preliminary Probability Intermediate Cell Generalize Conditionalization Epistemic Situation Epistemic Probability 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.



For helpful comments and/discussion, I thank Don Fallis, Richard Healey, Chris Howard, Justin Lillge, Mark Timmons, Alex von Stein, Sarah Wright, and especially Joel Pust.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of ArizonaTucsonUSA

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