, Volume 80, Issue 2, pp 467–476 | Cite as

When Fodor Met Frege

  • Jonathan Berg
Critical Discussion


In the third chapter of LOT 2—"LOT Meets Frege's Problem (Among Others)"—Jerry Fodor argues that LOT (the language-of-thought hypothesis) provides a solution to "Frege's Problem," as well as to Kripke's Paderewski puzzle (Fodor, LOT 2: The language of thought revisited. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008). I argue that most of what Fodor says in his discussion of Frege's problem is mistaken.


Fodor Frege Kripke Paderewski Belief Propositional attitudes Language of thought Substitution failure Pragmatics 


  1. Berg, J. (2012). Direct belief: An essay on the semantics, pragmatics, and metaphysics of belief. Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Fodor, J. A. (2008). LOT 2: The language of thought revisited. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Kripke, S. (1977). Speaker’s reference and semantic reference. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 2, 255–276. Rpt. in Contemporary perspectives in the philosophy of language. Ed. French, et al. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979, pp. 6–27.Google Scholar
  4. Kripke, S. (1979). A puzzle about belief. In A. Margalit (Ed.), Meaning and use (pp. 239–283). Dordrecht: D. Reidel.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of HaifaHaifaIsrael

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