When Fodor Met Frege
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In the third chapter of LOT 2—"LOT Meets Frege's Problem (Among Others)"—Jerry Fodor argues that LOT (the language-of-thought hypothesis) provides a solution to "Frege's Problem," as well as to Kripke's Paderewski puzzle (Fodor, LOT 2: The language of thought revisited. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008). I argue that most of what Fodor says in his discussion of Frege's problem is mistaken.
KeywordsFodor Frege Kripke Paderewski Belief Propositional attitudes Language of thought Substitution failure Pragmatics
- Kripke, S. (1977). Speaker’s reference and semantic reference. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 2, 255–276. Rpt. in Contemporary perspectives in the philosophy of language. Ed. French, et al. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979, pp. 6–27.Google Scholar
- Kripke, S. (1979). A puzzle about belief. In A. Margalit (Ed.), Meaning and use (pp. 239–283). Dordrecht: D. Reidel.Google Scholar