, Volume 80, Issue 2, pp 261–273 | Cite as

Infallibility in the Newcomb Problem

Original Article


It is intuitively attractive to think that it makes a difference in Newcomb’s problem whether or not the predictor is infallible, in the sense of being certainly actually correct. This paper argues that that view (A) is irrational and (B) manifests a well-documented cognitive illusion.


Decision Theory Lottery Ticket Causal Decision Theory Evidential Decision Theory Correct Predictor 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of PhilosophyUniversity of CambridgeCambridgeUK

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