, Volume 79, Supplement 3, pp 545–566 | Cite as

Teleosemantics and Pushmi-Pullyu Representations

Original Article


One of the main tenets of current teleosemantic theories is that simple representations are Pushmi-Pullyu states, i.e. they carry descriptive and imperative content at the same time. In the paper I present an argument that shows that if we add this claim to the core tenets of teleosemantics, then (1) it entails that, necessarily, all representations are Pushmi-Pullyu states and (2) it undermines one of the main motivations for the Pushmi-Pullyu account.


Main Motivation Imperative Content Descriptive Content Representational Content Couple Representation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.



I would like to thank Agustin Vicente, Brian Leahy, Manolo Martinez, David Pineda, an anonymous referee and the audience of the 6th Latin Meeting for Analytic Philosophy for helpful comments and incisive criticisms. This work was supported by the scholarhsip BES-2008-005255 from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (MICINN), the Research Projects ‘The Naturalization of Subjectivity’ (ref. FFI2010-15717), ‘Modal Aspects of Materialist Realism’ (ref. HUM2007-61108) and Consolider-Ingenio project CSD2009-00056.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Universitat de GironaGironaSpain

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