, Volume 79, Supplement 2, pp 331–338 | Cite as

Logical Pluralism: Another Application for Chunk and Permeate

Original Article


A motivation behind one kind of logical pluralism is the thought that there are different kinds of objects, and that reasoning about situations involving these different kinds requires different kinds of logics. Given this picture, a natural question arises: what kind of logical apparatus is appropriate for situations which concern more than one kind of objects, such as may arise, for example, when considering the interactions between the different kinds? The paper articulates an answer to this question, deploying the methodology of Chunk and Permeate, developed in a different context by Brown and Priest (J Philos Log 33:379–388, 2004).


Quantum Logic Intuitionist Logic Relevant Logic Paraconsistent Logic Underlying Logic 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of MelbourneMelbourneAustralia
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of St AndrewsSt AndrewsScotland, UK
  3. 3.The Graduate CenterCity University of New YorkNew YorkUSA

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