, Volume 78, Issue 6, pp 1381–1403 | Cite as

First Order Expressivist Logic

Original Article


This paper provides finitary jointly necessary and sufficient acceptance and rejection conditions for the logical constants of a first order quantificational language. By introducing the notion of making an assignment as a distinct object level practice—something you do with a sentence—(as opposed to a meta-level semantic notion) and combining this with the practice of (hypothetical and categorical) acceptance and rejection and the practice of making suppositions one gains a structure that is sufficiently rich to fully characterize the class of classical first order theories. The analysis thus provides a way of characterizing classical first order quantification by expressivist means.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Royal Institute of TechnologyStockholmSweden

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