What Angles Can Tell Us About What Holes Are Not
In this paper I argue that holes are not objects, but should instead be construed as properties or relations. The argument proceeds by first establishing a claim about angles: that angles are not objects, but properties or relations. It is then argued that holes and angles belong to the same category, on the grounds that they share distinctive existence and identity conditions. This provides an argument in favour of categorizing holes as one categorizes angles. I then argue that a commitment to the existence of properties to be identified with holes provides sufficient resources to account for true claims about holes.
KeywordsSpatial Relation Material Object Ontological Category Composition Condition Perceptual Awareness
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