Temporal Parts and Time Travel
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This paper argues that, in light of certain scenarios involving time travel, Sider’s definition of ‘instantaneous temporal part’ cannot be accepted in conjunction with a semantic thesis that perdurantists often assume. I examine a rejoinder from Sider, as well as Thomson’s alternative definition of ‘instantaneous temporal part’, and show how neither helps. Given this, we should give up on the perdurantist semantic thesis. I end by recommending that, once we no longer accept such semantics, we should accept a new set of definitions, which are superior in certain respects to Sider’s original set.
KeywordsTime Travel Temporal Part Abstracted Predicate Relevant Kind Person Stage
With thanks to Ross Cameron, Katherine Hawley, Robin Le Poidevin, Joseph Melia, Jon Robson, Jonathan Tallant and Duncan Watson. I must extend special thanks to the two anonymous referees from this journal, whose comments were invaluable.
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