, Volume 71, Issue 3, pp 355–359 | Cite as

A Solution to the Cable Guy Paradox

  • Ruth Weintraub


The Cable Guy will definitely come between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m., and I can bet on one of two possibilities: that he will arrive between 8 and 12, or between 12 and 4. Since I have no more information, it seems (eminently) plausible to suppose the two bets are equally attractive. Yet Hajek has presented a tantalising argument that purports to show that the later interval is, initial appearances to the contrary, more choice worthy. In this paper, I rebut the argument.


Utility Function Actual World Open Interval Subjective Probability Future Preference 
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  4. Van Fraassen, B. C. (1984). Belief and the will. Journal of Philosophy, 81, 235–256.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosohy DepartmentTel-Aviv UniversityRamat-Aviv, Tel-AvivIsrael

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