Abstract
William Lycan has articulated “a simple argument” for higher-order representation (HOR) theories of a variety of consciousness sometimes labeled ‘awareness consciousness’ (Lycan, Analysis 61.1, January 3–4, 2001). The purpose of this article is to critically assess the influential argument-strategy of the simple argument. I argue that, as stated, the simple argument fails since it is invalid. Moreover, I argue that an obvious “quick fix” would beg the question against competing same-order representation (SOR) theories of awareness consciousness. I then provide a reconstruction of the argument and argue that although the reconstructed argument deserves consideration, it is also too simple as stated. In particular, it raises several controversial questions about the nature of mental representation. These questions must be addressed before a verdict as to the cogency of the HOR argument-strategy can be reached. But since the questions are controversial, a cogent argument for HOR theories of awareness consciousness is unlikely to be simple.
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Notes
See, e.g., Block (2003) for a catalogue of arguments against representationalism.
Sometimes this variety of consciousness is called ‘state consciousness.’ But, as Lycan notes, this phrase is used in various ways. However, the same may be said of the phrase ‘conscious awareness’ which Lycan sometimes uses. Block uses ‘reflexive consciousness’ for a state “…that is the subject of another of the subject’s states” (Block 2001, p. 205). But Block’s statement of reflexive consciousness in terms of a higher-order representation appears to beg the question from the outset. Consequently, I’ll stick with ‘awareness consciousness.’ The slight awkwardness of the label may serve as a reminder that it is a quasi-technical term used to denote a variety of state consciousness. My subsequent use of ‘consciousness’ is shorthand for ‘awareness consciousness.’ Finally, awareness consciousness should be distinguished from phenomenal consciousness as well as from Block’s notion of access consciousness and from Burge’s related notion of rational-access consciousness (Block 1995; Burge 2007).
Fred Dretske is perhaps the most prominent representationalist who resists this idea (Dretske 1993). Lycan restricts the explanandum as to exclude “sensory qualities… the original qualitative character of a sensory state” (Lycan 2001, p. 3 and n. 1). But Lycan notes that the restricted conclusion of The Simple Argument may serve as a lemma in a more comprehensive HOR account of consciousness (Ibid. fn. 2).
For example, David Rosenthal requires that the higher-order representation be non-inferential and non-observational (see, e.g., Rosenthal 1997). Such restrictions may help address the otherwise problematic phenomenon that one can represent one’s own unconscious mental states. For example, if one thinks about one’s unconscious states, this may not be sufficient to render the states themselves conscious. Rather, it would seem that one represents an unconscious state. An alternative, more modest HOR approach rejects the right-to-left direction of the biconditional. Since the argument which will be discussed pertains to the left-to-right direction, I shall leave the issue open.
See, e.g., (Lurz 2001). However, Lurz’s reply to Lycan also applies to the reconstruction of the argument that I am about to present. As far as I am aware, it has not been previously noted in print that Lycan’s simple argument is invalid.
Perhaps this stretches of the principle of charity since Lycan writes “The argument is valid…” (Ibid. p. 3).
Kriegel and Williford characterize what they label ‘the self-representational theory of consciousness’ as follows: “…a mental state is conscious if and only if it represents itself in the right way.” (Kriegel and Williford 2006 p. 1) In Sect. 6, I briefly discuss a specification of the ‘in the right way’ – component.
It is only fair to note that the self-representation theories were not as prominent in 2001 when Lycan published his argument as they are today.
I will leave it open whether ‘S’ stands for ‘simple’ or ‘subtle.’ A more telling name might be ‘The Causal Co-Variance Argument.’
Some details in (1)–(3) are slightly altered in the corresponding S1–S3. In particular, Lycan’s premise (3) does in fact consist of two assumptions (or, perhaps, an assumption and a consequence thereof). The one assumption identifies intentionality with representation. The other makes representation a necessary condition on intentionality. I consider only the latter, weaker assertion. Accordingly, the conclusion of Argument S is also weaker than the conclusion of The Simple Argument. Of course, since Argument S contains new (and controversial) premises, Lycan is not committed to either version.
Of course, an ambitious HOR-theorist might seek to substitute the relevant ‘only ifs’ with biconditionals or the ‘is of identity.’ One might pursue this ambition by restricting the kind of mental representation in question (e.g., Rosenthal 1997). But I will focus on the more modest argument.
It has not gone unnoticed that causal co-variance theories are in conflict with SOR theories (see, e.g., Levine 2001, pp. 171–173, 2006, pp. 186–187; Kriegel 2003, pp. 481–483, 2005, pp. 41–45). For example, Kriegel sets forth a self-standing argument against SOR-theories from “naturalistic” theories of representation which “appeal to causal relations” along with the assumption that “no state can bring itself into existence” (Kriegel 2005, pp. 44–45). However, Levine and Kriegel are primarily concerned with whether SOR theories are compatible with naturalistic accounts of consciousness. In contrast, in the present context, the added premises serve the twofold purpose of (i) ruling out SOR theories and (ii) establishing HOR theories. In this manner, Argument S integrates the debate regarding the rationale for HOR theories with a putative general problem for SOR theories. As the differences in formulation and emphasis indicate, I came upon the issue independently of Levine’s and Kriegel’s discussions (and vice versa).
However, I believe the assumption may be motivated by reflection on the causal roles of mental states.
Interestingly, sophisticated versions have been provided by FOR theorists (Tye 1995, p. 105; Dretske 1988, esp. Chap. 3). Note, however, that Tye and Dretske are FOR theorists about ‘phenomenal consciousness.’ With modifications, Tye’s ‘subjunctive’ formulation may figure as an alternative premise:
S4alt: A mental state, M*, is S’s mental representation of an object, O, iff (if optimal conditions were to obtain, then M* would be tokened in S iff (O obtains and O cause M*)).
A dialectical disadvantage of this formulation is that it requires additional premises for the validity of the argument. For instance, it requires the premise that it is possible that the relevant optimal conditions obtain. I believe that the required “auxiliary premises” are quite benign. But they are better avoided for the sake of simplicity. The points I shall make regarding S4 apply to S4alt mutatis mutandis.
Moreover, SOR theorists have attempted to develop partial self-reference accounts that overcome the worry. I briefly discuss such an SOR approach below. The dialectical point, however, is that if a version of SOR theory is compatible with S4 and S5, the conjunction of these premises does not beg the question against the SOR theorist.
I note this limitation of the causal co-variance theory of representation as a general problem for it. It does not bear straightforwardly on Argument S. In the case of a higher-order representation, it is the first-order state which is represented rather than its non-empirical content. And, presumably, states with empirical and non-empirical contents cause other states in similar manners.
It is difficult to characterize the relevant difference between representational mental states and mere information-carrying states. As a first approximation, we may note that genuine mental representation is constitutively associated with veridicality. It is an important aspect of the nature of representational mental states that they can be veridical or non-veridical. In contrast, it appears that we can fully explain the nature of a given physical state of a plant without considering whether it is veridical or not. As Dretske famously noted, the plant lacks the capacity for misrepresentation (Dretske 1986, 1995).
Recall Descartes’ discovery that certain self-representational thoughts such as ‘I am (hereby) thinking’ can’t ‘misrepresent’. Such thoughts are in Burge’s terminology “self-verifying.” (Burge 1988)
Kriegel argues that it is the complex state, M, that is conscious in virtue of the representational relations between its parts, Mp1 and Mp2 (Kriegel 2006, p. 151). Van Gulick, in contrast, argues that the represented state-part, Mp1, becomes consciousness in virtue of being “recruited” into what he calls “a globally integrated complex.” This complex’s “organization and intentional content embodies a heightened degree of reflexive self-awareness.” However, the complex does not “embody” this reflexive self-awareness via a separate state-part, Mp2. So, Kriegel’s and Van Gulick’s approaches seem to differ in terms of what exactly is said to be consciousness. Gennaro, in turn, says that “the whole complex state (M—in the present notation) is conscious and that there is something it is like to be in only part of it (Mp1—in the present notation)” (Gennaro 2006, p. 241). The “only” occurs in Gennaro’s qualification because he rejects that the representing part of M, Mp2, is conscious. Gennaro adds that “…from a more third-person point of view, we can see that the entire complex (brain) state should be understood as conscious” whereas “…there is something it is like to be in only part of M in the sense that S is only consciously aware of the content of Mp1 from the first-person point of view” (Gennaro 2006, p. 241 original italics, my notation). The further complexities regarding first vs. third-person perspectives and what-it-is-likeness go beyond what I can address here. But Gennaro’s remarks exemplify that an account that is, by his own taxonomy, subsumed under (SOMT10) may differ radically from Kriegel’s characterization. (Gennaro 2006, fn. 6 and section 4.3. See, however, Kriegel 2006, fn. 28)
Some SOR theorist might find this upshot congenial given some important qualifications about the nature of M. For example, Van Gulick says that M does not contain an isolated higher-order state-part, Mp2. Rather, says Van Gulick, M “embodies heightened degree of reflexive self-awareness” (Van Gulick 2006).
I emphasize that I have not considered all versions of the partial self-representation approach. Moreover, an SOR theorist may respond to Argument S in other ways. For example, I have not discussed a response that consists in rejecting S4 since many SOR theorists have naturalist/reductionist inclinations that may call for a causal account of mental representation. However, it is consistent with SOR accounts to reject S4. Finally, I have set aside some grave independent problems for (SOMT10).
This methodological upshot also applies to representational approaches of phenomenal consciousness.
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Acknowledgements
Thanks to Tyler Burge, Thomas Geisnæs, Oliver Kauffman, Uriah Kriegel, Robert Lurz, audiences at the PHIS Graduate Conference in 2003 and the UCLA Albritton Society in 2007. Thanks also to referees for Erkenntnis and The Monist. Special thanks to Julie Brummer. Dedicated to Ben Chan, Erica Gielow, Jen Nery and Collin O’Neil to whom the paper was presented in a hot-tub in Las Vegas in 2003. (Note-to-self for future hot-tub presentations: Laminate handouts!) The completion of the paper was supported by a Reichenbach Graduate Student Research Fellowship at UCLA (for which I am grateful to David Kaplan) and by The Danish Research Council for the Humanities.
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Gerken, M. Is There a Simple Argument for Higher-Order Representation Theories of Awareness Consciousness?. Erkenn 69, 243–259 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-008-9116-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-008-9116-z