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Erkenntnis

, Volume 66, Issue 3, pp 393–407 | Cite as

Freedom, Fiction and Evidential Decision Theory

  • Phyllis Kirstin McKay
Article

Abstract

This paper argues against evidential decision-theory, by showing that the newest responses to its biggest current problem – the medical Newcomb problems – don’t work. The latest approach is described, and the arguments of two main proponents of it – Huw Price and CR Hitchcock – clearly distinguished and examined. It is argued that since neither new defence is successful, causation remains essential to understanding means-end agency.

Keywords

Migraine Rational Agent Decision Theory Reference Class Spurious Correlation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

Acknowledgements

I am indebted to many colleagues at both Bristol and Stirling for helpful comments and suggestions on this work. In particular I would like to thank Helen Beebee, Alexander Bird, Dorothy Edgington, Hannes Leitgeb, Samir Okasha, David Papineau, and two anonymous referees for comments leading to substantial improvements to the paper.

References

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  7. Price H.: 1986, Against Causal Decision Theory, Synthese 67, 195–212CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Price H.: 1991, Agency and Probabilistic Causality, British journal for the philosophy of science 42(2), 157–176CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, B.V. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of BristolBristolUK

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