Freedom, Fiction and Evidential Decision Theory
This paper argues against evidential decision-theory, by showing that the newest responses to its biggest current problem – the medical Newcomb problems – don’t work. The latest approach is described, and the arguments of two main proponents of it – Huw Price and CR Hitchcock – clearly distinguished and examined. It is argued that since neither new defence is successful, causation remains essential to understanding means-end agency.
KeywordsMigraine Rational Agent Decision Theory Reference Class Spurious Correlation
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I am indebted to many colleagues at both Bristol and Stirling for helpful comments and suggestions on this work. In particular I would like to thank Helen Beebee, Alexander Bird, Dorothy Edgington, Hannes Leitgeb, Samir Okasha, David Papineau, and two anonymous referees for comments leading to substantial improvements to the paper.
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