This article explores two consequences of intentionalism. My first line of argument focuses on the impact of intentionalism on the ‚hard problem’ of phenomenal character. If intentionalism is true, the phenomenal supervenes on the intentional. Furthermore, if physicalism about the intentional is also true, the intentional supervenes on the physical. Therefore, if intentionalism and physicalism are both true, then, by transitivity of supervenience, physicalism about the phenomenal is true. I argue that this transitivity argument is not persuasive, because on any interpretation of its central terms, at least one of its premises is as controversial as its conclusion already is. My second line of argument is about the consequences of intentionalism for the error theory of color perception. I suggest that if intentionalism is true, projectivism must be true also, because under this condition there is no single concept of color that can be used for the qualification of objects as well as for the characterization of experiences.
KeywordsHard Problem Error Theory Phenomenal Character Informational Content Dispositional Property
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
I delivered previous versions of this talk to audiences at the Australian National University and the NEH Summer Seminar on Consciousness at Santa Cruz. I am indebted to all who took part in the ensuing discussion. For further comments and suggestions I am particularly indebted to: Karen Bennett, David Chalmers, Martin Davies, Frank Jackson, Brian Garrett, Aaron Zimmerman, Ralph Shumacher, and Laura Schroeter.
- Armstrong D.: 1968, A Materialist Theory of the Mind, Routledge and Kegan Paul, LondonGoogle Scholar
- Block, N.: 2000, ‚Mental Paint’, in M. Hahn and B. Ramberg (eds.), Essays in Honor of Tyler Burge, MIT Press, pp. 125–151. References are to the PDF versionGoogle Scholar
- Byrne A.: 2001a, Intentionalism Defended, Philosophical Review 110, 199–240Google Scholar
- Chalmers D.: 1996, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
- Crane T.: 2002, Elements of Mind, Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
- Davies, M.: 1997, ‚Externalism and Experience’, in N. Block et al. (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, MIT Press, Cambridge/MA, pp. 309–327Google Scholar
- Dretske F.: 1995, Naturalizing the Mind, MIT Press, Cambridge/MAGoogle Scholar
- Evans G.: 1985, A Commentary on Chapter One of Strawson’s Individuals, in G. Evans (ed.), Collected Papers, Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
- Harman G.: 1990, The Intrinsic Quality of Experience, Philosophy of Mind and Action Theory: Philosophical Perspectives 4, 31–52Google Scholar
- Harman G.: 1996, Explaining Objective Color in terms of Subjective Reactions, in E. Villanueva (ed.), Philosophical Issues 7 (Perception), Ridgeview, Atascadero/CA, pp. 1–17Google Scholar
- Kripke S.: 1982, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Harvard University Press, Cambridge/MAGoogle Scholar
- Ludlow, P., Y. Nagasawa and D. Stoljar (eds.): 2004, There’s Something about Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson’s Knowedge Argument, MIT Press, Cambridge/MAGoogle Scholar
- Lycan W.: 1996, Consciousness and Experience. MIT Press, Cambridge/MAGoogle Scholar
- Peacocke C.: 1983, Sense and Content, Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
- Shoemaker S.: 1994, Phenomenal Character, Nous 28, 21–38Google Scholar
- Shoemaker S.: 1996, The First Person Perspective and Other Essays, Cambridge University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
- Stoljar D.: 2004, The Argument from Diaphanousness, in R. Stainton, M. Escurdia, C. Viger (eds.), New Essays in the Philosophy of Language and Mind. Supplemental Volume of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy, University of Calgary Press, Calgary, pp. 341–390Google Scholar
- Stoljar D.: 2006, Ignorance and Imagination: On the Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness, Oxford University Press, New YorkGoogle Scholar
- Tye M.: 1995, Ten Problems of Consciousness, MIT Press, Cambridge/MAGoogle Scholar
- Tye M.: 2000, Color, Content and Consciousness, MIT Press, Cambridge/MAGoogle Scholar