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Erkenntnis

, Volume 64, Issue 1, pp 115–138 | Cite as

The Tacking by Disjunction Paradox: Bayesianism Versus Hypothetico-Deductivism

  • Luca Moretti
Article

Abstract

Hypothetico-deductivists have struggled to develop qualitative confirmation theories not raising the so-called tacking by disjunction paradox. In this paper, I analyze the difficulties yielded by the paradox and argue that the hypothetico-deductivist solutions given by Gemes [1998, Erkenntnis 49, 1–20] and Kuipers [2000, From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism, Kluwer, Dordrecht] are questionable because they do not fit such analysis. I then show that the paradox yields no difficulty for the Bayesian who appeals to the Total Evidence Condition. I finally argue that the same strategy is unavailable to the hypothetico-deductivist.

Keywords

Evidence Condition Total Evidence Confirmation Theory Constructive Realism Bayesianism Versus 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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Copyright information

© Springer 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Center for Junior Research FellowsUniversity of KonstanzKostanzGermany

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