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Erkenntnis

, Volume 61, Issue 2–3, pp 435–455 | Cite as

Defeasibility And The Normative Grasp Of Context

  • Mark Lance
  • Margaret Little
Article

Abstract

In this article, we present an analysis of defeasible generalizations – generalizations which are essentially exception-laden, yet genuinely explanatory – in terms of various notions of privileged conditions. We argue that any plausible epistemology must make essential use of defeasible generalizations so understood. We also consider the epistemic significance of the sort of understanding of context that is required for understanding of explanatory defeasible generalizations on any topic.

Keywords

Privileged Condition Epistemic Significance Normative Grasp Defeasible Generalization Plausible Epistemology 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyGeorgetown UniversityWashington, DCUSA

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