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Environment Systems and Decisions

, Volume 33, Issue 4, pp 486–499 | Cite as

Assessing ICT risk through a Monte Carlo method

  • Fabrizio Baiardi
  • Daniele Sgandurra
Article

Abstract

To assess and manage the risk due to an information and communication system before its deployment, data of interest can be produced by a Monte Carlo method. This paper presents Haruspex, a software tool that applies a Monte Carlo method to simulate intelligent and adaptive threat agents that reach predefined goals through plan with several attacks. The samples that Haruspex collects are used to compute statistics on the agent’s impacts and their plans as well as to select cost-effective countermeasures. We describe the rationale and the implementation of Haruspex, the inputs it requires and the simulation of how the agents select and implement their plans. After discussing the validation and the performance of the first version of Haruspex, we present a case study and the first set of experimental results.

Keywords

Risk assessment ICT system Monte Carlo simulation Attack plans Countermeasures 

Notes

Acknowledgments

We thank the referees for their suggestions that noticeably improved the paper. The design of Haruspex has been discussed in a long and fruitful cooperation with C. Telmon who also has been involved in the design of the first prototype. The first prototype has been developed by G. Piga in his graduation thesis. The assessment of the Università di Pisa ICT network has been implemented by R. Bertolotti with the support of the Centro Serra, Università di Pisa. This works has been supported by an IBM Shared University Research Grant.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Dipartimento di InformaticaUniversità di PisaPisaItaly
  2. 2.Istituto di Informatica e TelematicaCNRPisaItaly

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