European Journal of Law and Economics

, Volume 38, Issue 3, pp 485–512 | Cite as

Settlement probability asymmetries in the Swedish Labour Court

  • Morgan Westéus


This paper focuses on settlement probabilities for different types of representation within the Swedish Labour Court. Empirical estimates on a set of cases concerned with unjust dismissals show that private representatives are generally less likely to reach a settlement than their union counterparts. The settlement probabilities converge following court-mandated information disclosure, which suggests that information asymmetry is an important factor in explaining differences in settlement behaviour and that private negotiations are not sufficient in general.


Unjust dismissals Negotiations Settlements Trade unions 

JEL Classification

D81 D82 J52 K31 K41 



The author wishes to thank Thomas Aronsson, Karl-Gustaf Löfgren, Kurt Brännäs, Daniel Halvarsson and the staff at the Swedish Labour Court. The paper has also benefitted greatly from the comments given by an anonymous referee and the participants at the EALE Conference 2012 and the Swedish National Conference in Economics 2012.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUmeå School of Business and EconomicsUmeåSweden

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