European Journal of Law and Economics

, Volume 36, Issue 2, pp 243–269 | Cite as

Injunctive and reverse settlements in competition-blocking litigation

Article

Abstract

We distinguish standard settlements, in which the status quo is preserved, and injunctive settlements, which prohibit the defendant’s activity. The reverse (payment) settlement is a special type of injunctive settlement. We examine the divergence between private and social incentives to settle and policies that would minimize socially undesirable injunctive and reverse settlements (e.g., banning reverse settlements). The results are applied to competition-blocking litigation, such as patent infringement and antidumping.

Keywords

Litigation Reverse payment settlements Injunctive settlements Patent infringement litigation Waiver agreements Antidumping 

JEL Classification

F13 K21 K33 K41 L43 O31 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Boston UniversityBostonUSA
  2. 2.Chicago-Kent College of LawChicagoUSA

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