European Journal of Law and Economics

, Volume 26, Issue 2, pp 213–232 | Cite as

Screening markets for cartel detection: collusive markers in the CFD cartel-audit

  • Christian Lorenz


Coordination Failure Diagnostics (CFD) is a model that analyses real market processes with the help of time pattern analysis and investigates whether they operate efficiently. For competition authorities CFD can be employed to detect illegal covert cartels. The CFD cartel-audit should enable the detection of cartels via characteristic market process patterns. This is based on the assumption that existing cartels cause failures in the observed process patterns. The CFD cartel-audit attempts to draw conclusions from these process patterns in order to find hidden cartels and to engage antitrust agencies into additional more detailed audits.

JEL Classifications

L13 L41 L61 D43 


Cartel detection Collusive marker Market screening Cartel audit Cement 



Christian Lorenz would like to thank Heinz Grossekettler, Carsten Burhop and Mei Yee Pang for useful remarks.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Centre for International Migration and DevelopmentFrankfurt a.M.Germany

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