De Economist

, Volume 157, Issue 3, pp 315–335 | Cite as

Experience Rating and the Inflow into Disability Insurance

  • Pierre Koning


This paper examines the effects of experience rating on the inflow into disability insurance (DI) in the Netherlands, using unique longitudinal administrative data from the social benefit administration. We follow a difference-in-differences approach to identify the impact of changes in DI premiums. Due to unawareness of the experience rating system, employers seem to have been triggered to increase preventative activities, once they have experienced increases in DI premium rates. We find this impact to be substantial, amounting to a 15% reduction of the DI inflow.

Key words

experience rating disability insurance panel data 

JEL Code(s)

H22 I12 C23 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy AnalysisThe HagueThe Netherlands

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