Advertisement

Environmental and Resource Economics

, Volume 35, Issue 3, pp 169–194 | Cite as

An Enforcement-Coalition Model: Fishermen and Authorities Forming Coalitions

  • Lone Grønbæk Kronbak
  • Marko Lindroos
Article

Abstract

The paper sets up a four-stage enforcement model of fish quotas. The purpose of the paper is to show how the level of enforcement set by the authorities affects the way fishermen form coalitions. We show that a high level of control effort yields less co-operation among fishermen, while in the case of low control effort, coalitions are somewhat self-enforcing. The paper further discusses how the optimal enforcement level changes when the coalition formation among authorities changes: centralised, partly centralised and decentralised authorities. We show that decentralised authorities set a lower level of control effort compared to the centralised authorities. The theoretical results are illustrated by simulations of the Baltic Sea cod fishery.

Key words

coalition formation fisheries management quota enforcement self-enforcing policy 

JEL classification

C70 Q22 Q28 

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Becker G. S. (1968) Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. Journal of Political Economy 76:169–217CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Caplan A. J., Silva E. C. D. (1999) Federal Acid Rain Games. Journal of Urban Economics 46:25–52CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Duarte C., Brasão A., Pintassilgo P. (2000) The Regional Management of the Northern Atlantic Bluefin Tuna: An Application of C-games. Marine Resource Economics 15:21–36Google Scholar
  4. Hannesson R. (1997) Fishing as a Supergame. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 32:309–322CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Holden M. (1996) The Common Fisheries Policy: Origin, Evaluation and Future. Fishing News Books, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  6. IBSFC (2003), Article V of the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources in the Baltic Sea and the Belts (the Gdansk Convention), signed on the 13th September 1973. http://www.ibsfc.org (under documentation)
  7. Jensen, C. L. (2001), Behavioural Modelling of Fishermen in the EU, Ph.D.-dissertation, University of Southern DenmarkGoogle Scholar
  8. Jensen, C. L. and M. Lindroos (2002), Centralised versus Decentralised Enforcement of Fish Quotas, Centre for Fisheries Economics working paper 1/2002, SNF Bergen, NorwayGoogle Scholar
  9. Jensen F., Vestergaard N. (2002a) Moral Hazard Problems in Fisheries Regulation: The Case of Illegal Landings and Discard. Resource and Energy Economics 24:281–299CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Jensen F., Vestergaard N. (2002b) Management of Fisheries in the EU: A Principal-Agent Analysis. Marine Resource Economics 16:227–291Google Scholar
  11. Kronbak, L. G. (2004), The Dynamics of an Open Access: The Case of the Baltic Sea Cod Fishery, Department of Environmental and Business Economics Working Paper 31/02, University of Southern Denmark Esbjerg, DenmarkGoogle Scholar
  12. Kronbak, L. G. and M. Lindroos (2003), An Enforcement-Coalition Model: Fishermen and Authorities forming Coalitions, IME Working Paper no. 50/03, Department of Environmental and Business Economics, University of Southern DenmarkGoogle Scholar
  13. Lindroos, M. (2002), Coalitions in Fisheries, Helsinki School of Economics Working Papers W-321 Google Scholar
  14. Olson M. (1965) The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  15. Pintassilgo, P. (2003), ‘A Coalition Approach to the Management of High Seas Fisheries in the Presence of Externalities’, Natural Resource Modeling 16, forthcomingGoogle Scholar
  16. Ruseski G. (1998), International Fish Wars: The Strategic Roles for Fleet Licensing and Effort Subsidies. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 36:70–88CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Sutinen J. G., Andersen P. (1985) The Economics of Fisheries Law Enforcement. Land Economics 61:387–397CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Environmental and Business EconomicsUniversity of Southern DenmarkEsbjergDenmark
  2. 2.Department of Economics and ManagementUniversity of HelsinkiHelsinkiFinland

Personalised recommendations