Computational Economics

, Volume 36, Issue 3, pp 231–235 | Cite as

Numerical Solutions of Asymmetric, First-Price, Independent Private Values Auctions: Comment



This comment analyzed the effectiveness of searching method for the upper bound of bidding function in Gayle and Richard’s (Computational Economics 32:245–278, 2008) algorithm. A new searching method is proposed on the base of such analysis, which can be more effective and more efficient.


Search method Numerical solution First-price auction 


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  1. Gayle, W.-R., Richard, J. F. (2008). Numerical solutions of asymmetric, first-price, independent private values auctions. Computational Economics, 32, 245–278.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Riley, J. G., Samuelson, W. F. (1981). Optimal auctions. The American Economic Review, 71, 381–392.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Shanghai Jiao Tong UniversityShanghaiChina

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