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Computational Economics

, Volume 35, Issue 3, pp 211–234 | Cite as

Endogenous Neighborhood Selection and the Attainment of Cooperation in a Spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma Game

  • Jason Barr
  • Troy Tassier
Article

Abstract

There is a large literature in economics and elsewhere on the emergence and evolution of cooperation in the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Recently this literature has expanded to include games in a setting where agents play only with local neighbors in a specified geography. In this paper we explore how the ability of agents to move and choose new locations and new neighbors influences the emergence of cooperation. First, we explore the dynamics of cooperation by investigating agent strategies that yield Markov transition probabilities. We show how different agent strategies yield different Markov chains which generate different asymptotic behaviors in regard to the attainment of cooperation. Second, we investigate how agent movement affects the attainment of cooperation in various networks using agent-based simulations. We show how network structure and density can affect cooperation with and without agent movement.

Keywords

Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Cooperation Agent-based economics Endogenous networks Markov chains 

JEL Classification

C63 C72 C73 D85 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsRutgers University, NewarkNewarkUSA
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsFordham UniversityBronxUSA

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