The Strategic Exploitation of Limited Information and Opportunity in Networked Markets
This paper studies the effect of constraining interactions within a market. A model is analysed in which boundedly rational agents trade with and gather information from their neighbours within a trade network. It is demonstrated that a trader’s ability to profit and to identify the equilibrium price is positively correlated with its degree of connectivity within the market. Where traders differ in their number of potential trading partners, well-connected traders are found to benefit from aggressive trading behaviour. Where information propagation is constrained by the topology of the trade network, connectedness affects the nature of the strategies employed.
KeywordsTrade network Agent-based computational economics Information Strategy
JEL ClassificationsD85 D83 D40
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