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Crime, Law and Social Change

, Volume 69, Issue 2, pp 207–226 | Cite as

Policing through misunderstanding: insights from the configuration of financial policing

  • Anthony Amicelle
Article

Abstract

How does a configuration of policing work regardless of the differences among its constituent members, who may relate to various social fields and range from for-profit organizations to law-enforcement and other state agencies? The article aims at providing some of the answers to this critical question in the light of financial policing, at the interface between the fields of finance and security. With the emphasis on money laundering and terrorist financing, financial policing resonates with other policing configurations that are ‘partly detached from the institutions of the police and start referring to a more general associative practice of assembling risk knowledge, technologies and agencies into networks that govern through rendering and distributing risks’ (Huysmans 2014). The paper argues that everyday financial policing is based on a misunderstanding, as both its current condition of possibility and the fundamental structure of communication between the involved parties. This focus on misunderstanding contributes to question traditional interpretations of (national and/or international) partnership against policing-related public problems. To help understand the paradoxical and controversial productivity of misunderstanding as a sine qua non condition of policing, the article draws on a transatlantic perspective with empirical research in the European Union Institutions, the United Kingdom and Canada.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of CriminologyUniversity of MontrealQuébecCanada

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