Skip to main content

Advertisement

SpringerLink
Log in

The governance of the financial action task force: an analysis of power and influence throughout the years

  • Published:
Crime, Law and Social Change Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

The international fight against money laundering illustrates changes in global governance as a result of the increasingly cross-border nature of crime and the need it creates for all involved to cooperate. The economic priorities and security concerns that surround it contributed to the strong evolution of global governance in this area and the status of anti-money laundering as a shared problem. The creation of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), its expansion and cementation throughout the years, is a good example of the many forces working together to responding to the demands of emerging criminal threats and trends. It offers a good illustration of how relationships in global governance have influenced FATF’s priorities and action and ultimately the way in which illicit financial flows are tackled. This analysis offers an overview of FATF’s network across time taking into account the role of states, international organisations, and the private sector in the decision-making processes. It argues that Great Powers – a small, but aligned, group of states of global economic relevance – are responsible for FATF’s direction and the international efforts against illicit financial flows. It suggests, however, that unlike what could be expected, their power is declining following the rise of private sector influence through resourceful, organised and transnational actions e.g. on information sharing.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. “Actors’ interests are, [for the purpose of this analysis], understood as primordial [and fixed]; from these they derive policy preferences for different issues” (([1], p.241; See also, [2], p.404; [3]).

  2. This phenomenon has been extensively studied at the UN level by the Global Policy Forum. See https://www.globalpolicy.org/corporate-influence/52644-gpf-analysis-on-corporate-influence.html See also [11]

  3. International organisations include the IMF, World Bank, FATF, UN, OECD and the EU. State representatives were mainly from UK, USA and France.

  4. See [15]

  5. See for example, “Public Private Partnerships in research” Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/research/industrial_technologies/ppp-in-research_en.html

  6. As the author claims to be a great power includes the military ability to “put up a serious fight” research defines European Union countries as a ‘dependent’ great powers military wise.

  7. ‘The Group of Seven (G-7) is an informal forum of countries representing around half of global economic output. It has met regularly since 1976 to discuss key issues related to global economic stability. The G-7 comprises Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors of 7 countries: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. Representatives of the European Union, including the EU Presidency and European Central Bank, as well as heads of international financial institutions also regularly attend’ [22].

  8. Interview with member state expert, March 2013.

  9. For example, FATF Presidencies to date match G-7 membership in 50% of the cases, and G-20 membership fully.

  10. The G-20 started in 1999 as a meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis. Its membership comprises 19 countries plus the European Union. See, [33].

  11. Interview with FATF secretariat, January 2013.

  12. Russia’s involvement in Syria and the Ukraine; Brazil’s ousting of Dilma Roussef; India’s demonitization

  13. Interview with NGO representatives, March 2013.

  14. Kirton offers a good set of tables on G-7/8 collaboration with civil society and institutions created through time.

  15. Note the Russian Federation (listed), Austria and Turkey (warned they would be listed) were the closest to the NCCT process that any developed economy got to therefore representing the exception to the rule.

  16. “FATF has almost as many members as world countries”[author cit], David Lewis at “Disconnecting from Global Finance: A Conversation on De-risking in the Commonwealth, 10 August 2016. See more at: http://thecommonwealth.org/media/event/disconnecting-global-finance-conversation-de-risking-commonwealth#sthash.LBx6mxrf.dpuf”

  17. It should be noted that the lack of ‘impactful’ participation may be related to the fact that the Plenary discussions are, in themselves, biased towards the interests of major powers.

  18. Author nformal discussion with IGO policy officer, December 2017.

  19. See World Bank, Financial Inclusion. Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialinclusion. And on de-risking. Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialmarketintegrity/brief/de-risking-in-the-financial-sector.

  20. The authors refer to IOs as international organisations, not ‘intergovernmental organisations’. However for the sake of this argument the concept can be considered interchangeable.

  21. Interview with IFI official, April 2013.

  22. Ibid.

  23. Interview with IFI official, March 2013.

  24. Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAPs); Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC)

  25. Interview with IGO official, September 2012.

  26. Interview with IFI official, April 2013.

  27. The author was unable to find written register of the meeting or its conclusions.

  28. Although some evidence of the Banking Federation attempting to provide amendments to the first directive does exists. See, Federation Bancaire de la Communauté Européene, ‘Amended proposal for a Council Directive on prevention of use of the financial systems for the purpose of Money laundering’, Fax, L 15 MS/DZ, Nr 190, 13 February 1991. Author interviews confirm increase.

  29. Interviews with private sector representatives, March 2013, July 2012, and November 2012.

  30. See the private sectors responses to FATF consultations in the wakening of standard revisions. See, [81, 82]

  31. Author interviews with private sector representatives, July 2012.

  32. Corroborated by Interview with private sector representative, July 2012. See more on this topic in, [83]

  33. Interview with private sector representative, November 2012.

  34. UNSCR 2253 (2015) Available at http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12168.doc.htm

  35. Interview with IGO official, July 2012.

  36. See FATF Annual Reports from 1990 to 1994. After this date the working group leadership ceased to be available.

  37. Author Interview with an international financial institution compliance official, March 2013.

  38. See G-20 cooperation with OECD on measures to “inchpin of a major overhaul of the international tax architecture, whose aim is fighting against tax evasion, ending bank secrecy and tax havens, as well as addressing massive tax avoidance by multinational corporations.” [86].

  39. The Panama Papers are a collection of documents leaked from a Panama based law-firm exposing numerous international schemes to hide proceeds of crime, avoid tax and circumvent the requirements of the international financial system [87].

  40. See FATF, Outcomes of the Plenary meeting of the FATF, Paris, 22–24 February 2017. Available at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfgeneral/documents/outcomes-plenary-february-2017.html

  41. Author interviews with private sector representatives, 2015–2016.

  42. Author interview, August 2016.

  43. FATF, Outcomes of the Plenary meeting of the FATF, Paris, 22–24 February 2017. Available at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfgeneral/documents/outcomes-plenary-february-2017.html

References

  1. Milner, H. V. (1997). Interests, institutions, and information. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  2. da Conceição-Heldt, E. (2011). Variation in EU member states’ preferences and the Commission’s discretion in the Doha round. Journal of European Public Policy, 18(3), 403–419.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  3. Moravcsik, A. (1993). Preferences and power in the European community: A liberal intergovernmentalist approach. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 31(4), 473–524.

    Google Scholar 

  4. Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S. (2001). Power and interdependence. New York: Longman.

    Google Scholar 

  5. Vogel, D., & Kagan, R. A. (Eds.). (2005). Dynamics of regulatory change: How globalization affects national regulatory policies. Berkeley: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  6. Young, O. R. (1969). Interdependencies in world politics. International Journal, 24(4), 726–750.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  7. Held, D., Goldblatt, D., & Perraton, J. (1999). Global transformations: Politics, economics and culture. Oxford: Polity Press.

    Google Scholar 

  8. Bernstein, S., & Cashore, B. (2000). Globalization, four paths of internationalization and domestic policy change: The case of eco forestry in British Columbia, Canada. Canadian Journal of Political Science, 33(1), 67–99.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  9. Galbraith, J. K. (2008). Policy and security implications of the financial crisis: a plan for America [Research]. Retrieved from http://www.networkideas.org/featart/oct2008/fa24_Galbraith.htm.

  10. NATO (2009). World financial crisis: what it means for security (NATO/OTAN). Retrieved 8 June 2013, from http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2009/financialcrisis/EN/index.htm.

  11. Hall, R. B., & Biersteker, T. J. (2002). The emergence of private authority in global governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  12. Slaughter, A.-M. (2005). A new world order (New Ed). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  13. Avgouleas, E. (2012). Governance of global financial markets: The law, the economics, the politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  14. Keohane, R. O., & Milner, H. V. (1996). Internationalization and domestic politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  15. Verma, M. (2016). Role of the state in partnerships with the private sector. Journal of Development Policy and Practice, 1(1), 53–70.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  16. Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). The tragedy of great power politics. New York: Norton.

    Google Scholar 

  17. Bull, H. (2012). The anarchical society: A study of order in world politics. New York: Columbia University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  18. Nye, J. S. (2011). The future of power. New York: Public Affairs.

    Google Scholar 

  19. Bailin, A. (2005). From traditional to group hegemony: The G7, the liberal economic order and the core-periphery gap. Aldershot: Ashgate.

    Google Scholar 

  20. Luttwak, E. N. (1994). Where are the great powers? At home with the kids. Foreign Affairs, 73(4), 23–28.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  21. Clark, I. (2009). Bringing hegemony back in: The United States and international order. International Affairs, 85(1), 23–36.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  22. UK Government (2012). UK announces spring meeting of G7 finance ministers. Retrieved 30 January 2014, from https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-announces-spring-meeting-of-g7-finance-ministers.

  23. G-7 (1989). Economic declaration. Retrieved 26 June 2012, from http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/1989paris/communique/index.html.

  24. Ikenberry, G. J. (2004). Liberalism and empire: Logics of order in the American unipolar age. Review of International Studies, 30(4), 609–630.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  25. Drezner, D. W. (2008). All politics is global: Explaining international regulatory regimes. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  26. FATF (1992). FATF annual report 1991–1992 (No. III). Paris: FATF. Retrieved from http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/s-t/switzerland/documents/fatfannualreport1991-1992.html.

  27. G-7 (2014). G7/8 finance ministers. Retrieved 30 January 2014, from http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/finance/.

  28. G-7 (1998). Conclusions of G7 finance ministers. Retrieved from http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/finance/fm980509.htm.

  29. G-7 (2002). G7 combating the financing of terrorism: first year report. Retrieved from http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/finance/fm092702pr1.htm.

  30. G-7 (2009a). Statement of G7 finance ministers and central bank governors. Retrieved from http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/finance/fm090214.htm.

  31. G-7 (1999a). Statement of G-7 finance ministers and central bank governors. Retrieved from http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/finance/fm042699.htm.

  32. Larionova, M. (2012). The European Union as a global player: Creating global public goods through partnerships and multilateral institutions. In M. Larionova (Ed.), The European Union in the G8 (pp. 3–9). London: Ashgate.

    Google Scholar 

  33. G20 (2014). About G20. Retrieved 31 January 2014, from http://www.g20.org/about_G20.

  34. G-7 (1999b). Report of G7 finance ministers to the Köln Economic Summit. Retrieved from http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/finance/fm061999.htm.

  35. Kirton, J. (2012a). G8 and G20 financial crisis governance: The European Union contribution. In M. Larionova (Ed.), The European Union in the G8 (pp. 173–198). London: Ashgate.

    Google Scholar 

  36. G-7 (2005). Statement on actions to combat money laundering and terrorist finance. Retrieved from http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/finance/fm051203_annex.htm.

  37. G-7 (2008). Statement of G7 finance ministers and central bank governors. Retrieved from http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/finance/fm080209.htm.

  38. G-20 (2009b). G20 leaders’ statement - 2009 Pittsburgh summit [standard, policy report, assessment, agreement]. Retrieved 11 October 2012, from http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/g20/summit-sommet/g20/declaration_092509.aspx?view=d.

  39. G-7 (2009b). Statement of G7 finance ministers and central bank governors. Retrieved from http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/finance/fin090424.htm.

  40. G-20 (2009a). Declaration on strengthening the financial system. Retrieved from http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/g20_summit/2009-1/annex2.html.

  41. Barnett, M. N., & Duvall, R. (Eds.). (2005). Power in global governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  42. Kahler, M. (1992). Multilateralism with small and large numbers. International Organization, 46(3), 681–708.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  43. Wohlforth, W. C. (1999). The stability of a unipolar world. International Security, 24(1), 5–41.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  44. Wohlforth, W. C. (2009). Unipolarity, status competition, and great power war. World Politics, 61(1), 28–57.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  45. G-7 (2013). Overview of G7 finance ministers’ meeting in London. Retrieved 30 January 2014, from http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Overview-of-G7-finance-ministers.

  46. Woods, N. (2010). Global governance after the financial crisis: A new multilateralism or the last gasp of the great powers? Global Policy, 1(1), 51–63.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  47. G-20 (2012). Communiqué. Retrieved 1 February 2014, from http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2012/2012-120226-finance-en.html.

  48. G-20 (2011). Communiqué. Retrieved 1 February 2014, from http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2011/2011-finance-110219-en.html.

  49. G-20 (2014). A G20 agenda for growth and resilience in 2014. Retrieved 1 February 2014, from http://www.g20.org/g20_priorities/g20_2014_agenda.

  50. FATF Presidency (2016). Objectives for the Spanish presidency of the FATF (2016–2017). Retrieved 28 August 2016, from http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfgeneral/documents/objectives-2016-2017.html.

  51. Bayne, N. (1997). History of the G7 summit: The importance of American leadership. Denver, Colorado: Keynote address presented at the Explaining Summit Success: Prospects for the Denver summit of the Eight Retrieved from http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/annual/bayne1997/document.html#global.

    Google Scholar 

  52. Hurrell, A. (2005). Power, institutions, and the production of inequality. In M. Barnett (Ed.), Power in global governance (pp. 33–58). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  53. Treasury & Justice Departments (1999). Treasury & justice money laundering strategy 1999. U.S. Departments of Treasury, Justice, and Homeland Security. Retrieved from http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/nmls.html.

  54. Rudich, D. V. (2005). Performing the twelve labors: The G8’s role in the fight against money laundering. G8 Governance Working Paper, [G8 governance number 12].

  55. FATF (2012b). Report to G20 leaders. Los Cabos: FATF. Retrieved from http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Report%20to%20G20%20Leaders%20June%202012%20.pdf.

  56. Kirton, J. (2012b). The G7/G8 system. In M. Larionova (Ed.), The European Union in the G8 (pp. 41–51). London: Ashgate.

    Google Scholar 

  57. Gray, J. (2016). The strange death of liberal politics. New Statesman. Retrieved from http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2017/03/who-would-oppose-scottish-independence-second-referendum-campaign.

  58. The Department of Treasury, & Department of Justice (1999). The national money laundering strategy for 1999. Retrieved from http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/money.pdf.

  59. Doyle, T. (2002). Cleaning up anti-money laundering strategies: Current FATF tactics needlessly violate international law. Houston Journal of International Law, 24, 279.

    Google Scholar 

  60. Roberts, M. (2003). Big brother isn’t just watching you, he’s also wasting your tax payer dollars: An analysis of the anti-money laundering provisions of the USA patriot act. Rutgers Law Review, 56, 573.

    Google Scholar 

  61. Mitchell, D. J. (2012). World Bank study shows how anti-money laundering rules hurt the poor. Forbes. Retrieved from http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielmitchell/2012/04/20/world-bank-study-shows-how-anti-money-laundering-rules-hurt-the-poor/.

  62. Jakobi, A. P. (2013). Common goods and evils?: The formation of global crime governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  63. Tsingou, E. (2005). Targeting money laundering: Global approach or diffusion of authority. In E. Krahmann (Ed.), New threats and new actors in international security (pp. 91–107). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  64. Diermeier, D., & Krehbiel, K. (2003). Institutionalism as a methodology. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 15(2), 123–144.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  65. Abbott, K. W., & Snidal, D. (1998). Why states act through formal international organizations. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 42(1), 3–32.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  66. Wechsler, W. F. (2001). Follow the money. Foreign Affairs, 80(4), 40–57.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  67. Gruber, L. (2000). Ruling the world: Power politics and the rise of supranational institutions. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  68. Levi, M. (2007). Pecunia non olet? The control of money-laundering revisited. In F. Bovenkerk & M. Levi (Eds.), The organized crime community (pp. 161–182). New York: Springer Retrieved from http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-0-387-39020-8_10.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  69. G-7 (2000). Statement of G-7 finance ministers and central bank governors. Retrieved from http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/finance/fm002201.htm.

  70. Snow, J. (2004). Statement by U.S. Treasury secretary John snow following the G7 finance ministers’ meeting. Retrieved from http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/finance/fm040207_snow.htm.

  71. Kerwer, D., & Hülsse, R. (2011). How international organizations rule the world. Journal of International Organizations Studies, 2(1). Retrieved from http://www.journal-iostudies.org/sites/journal-iostudies.org/files/JIOS201121final_5.pdf.

  72. Gilsinan, J. F., Millar, J., Seitz, N., Fisher, J., Harshman, E., Islam, M., & Yeager, F. (2008). The role of private sector organizations in the control and policing of serious financial crime and abuse. Journal of Financial Crime, 15(2), 111–123.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  73. Likosky, M. B. (2005). Privatising development: Transnational law, infrastructure and human rights. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  74. FATF (2012a). FATF Annual Report 2011–2012. Retrieved from http://www.fatf-gafi.org/documents/repository/fatfannualreport2011-2012.html.

  75. FATF (1996). FATF Annual Report 1995–1996. Retrieved from http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/u-z/unitedstates/documents/fatfannualreport1995-1996.html.

  76. FATF (2002a). FATF annual report for 2001–2002. FATF-GAFI. Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=PAC/COM/NEWS%282002%2969&docLanguage=En.

  77. House of Lords. (2009). Money laundering and the financing of terrorism (HL Paper 132–I No. 19). London: House of Lords Retrieved from http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldeucom/132/13202.htm.

    Google Scholar 

  78. G-8 (2013). Private sector dialogue on anti-money laundering and countering terrorist finance. Retrieved 10 September 2013, from https://www.gov.uk/government/news/g8-public-private-sector-dialogue-on-anti-money-laundering-and-countering-terrorist-finance.

  79. Nechaev, V. (2013). G8 public-private sector dialogue on anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) (FATF Presidential Address). Retrieved 10 September 2013, from http://www.fatf-gafi.org/documents/documents/ppsdsept13.html.

  80. World Bank (2013). Financial and private sector development - financial market integrity. Retrieved 16 July 2013, from http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTFINANCIALSECTOR/0,contentMDK:22176523~menuPK:6110545~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:282885,00.html.

  81. FATF. (2002b). Review of the FATF forty recommendations consultation paper (consultation paper). Paris: FATF Retrieved from http://www.antiguagaming.gov.ag/Money%20Laundering/FATF%2040%20Review.pdf.

    Google Scholar 

  82. FATF Secretariat. (2011). Consultation on Proposed Changes to the FATF Standards (p. 136). Paris: FATF Retrieved from http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/publicconsultation/First%20public%20consultation%20document%20responses%20financial%20sector%20part%201.pdf.

    Google Scholar 

  83. Alford, D. E. (1993). Anti-money laundering regulations: A burden on financial institutions. North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation, 19, 437.

    Google Scholar 

  84. FATF Secretariat. (2012). FATF’s response to the public consultation on the revision of the FATF Recommendations (report). Paris: FATF Retrieved from http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/fatfrecommendations/documents/fatfsresponsetothepublicconsultationontherevisionofthefatfrecommendation.html.

    Google Scholar 

  85. U.S. Departments of Treasury, Justice, and Homeland Security. (2003). 2003 National money laundering strategy. U.S: Departments of Treasury, Justice, and Homeland Security Retrieved from http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/nmls.html.

    Google Scholar 

  86. OECD (n.d.). OECD and the G20. Retrieved 29 August 2016, from https://www.oecd.org/g20/topics/taxation/.

  87. ICIJ (2016). The Panama Papers. Retrieved 29 August 2016, from https://panamapapers.icij.org/.

  88. Noonan, L. (2015). Banks face pushback over surging compliance and regulatory costs. Financial Times. Retrieved from http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e1323e18-0478-11e5-95ad-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3bVsms5pl.

  89. Noonan, L. (2016). Customer reporting failures top big bank fines. Financial Times. Retrieved from http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7993ab16-f2c0-11e5-aff5-19b4e253664a.html#axzz4Ie5NFgkg.

  90. The Wolfsberg Group (2011). Comment letter on FATF standards review January 2011. Retrieved 28 August 2016, from http://www.wolfsberg-principles.com/comment-letters.html.

  91. European Banking Federation (2013). EBF position on the EC Proposal for a 4th EU AML Directive. Retrieved from http://www.ebf-fbe.eu/ebf-positions/corporate-governance-financial-crime/.

  92. Home Office (2016). Findings from the call for information on the suspicious activity reports regime. Retrieved 28 August 2016, from https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/suspicious-activity-reports-regime.

  93. de Oliveira, I. S., & Ellis, C. (2015). Tackling money laundering: towards a new model for information sharing (Occasional Paper). RUSI. Retrieved from http://www.cfcs.london/publications/tackling-money-laundering-towards-a-new-model-for-information-sharing/.

  94. FATF Secretariat (2016c). Outcomes of the plenary meeting of the FATF. Retrieved 28 August 2016, from http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfgeneral/documents/outcomes-plenary-february-2016.html.

  95. G-20 (2016). Communiqué G20 finance ministers and central bank governors meeting. Retrieved 28 August 2016, from http://www.g20.org/English/Documents/Current/201603/t20160302_2182.html.

  96. FATF Secretariat (2016b). Dialogue with the private sector. Retrieved 28 August 2016, from http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfgeneral/documents/private-sector-apr-2016.html.

  97. The Institute of International Finance (2016). Facilitating effective sharing of AML/CFT information. Retrieved from https://www.iif.com/publication/regulatory-comment-letter/iif-submits-letter-effective-information-sharing-amlcft.

  98. FATF Secretariat (2016a). Consolidated FATF standards on information sharing. Retrieved 28 August 2016, from http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfrecommendations/documents/consolidated-fatf-standard-information-sharing.html.

  99. de Oliveira, I. S. (2016). Challenges to information sharing: perceptions and realities (Occasional Paper). RUSI. Retrieved from http://www.cfcs.london/publications/challenges-information-sharing-perceptions-realities/.

  100. Picciotto, S. (1997). Networks in international economic integration: Fragmented states and the dilemmas of neo-liberalism. Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, 17(1), 1014–1056.

    Google Scholar 

  101. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2252 (2015) Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, S/RES/2253. Available at https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2253.

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Royal United Services Institute, 61 Whitehall, Westminster, London, SW1A 2ET, UK

    Inês Sofia de Oliveira

Authors
  1. Inês Sofia de Oliveira
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Inês Sofia de Oliveira.

Additional information

The author is currently an advisor with the AML/CFT unit of the Portuguese Central Bank. The content of this study does not reflect the official opinion of the Central Bank. Responsibility for the information and views expressed in the study lies entirely with the author.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

de Oliveira, I.S. The governance of the financial action task force: an analysis of power and influence throughout the years. Crime Law Soc Change 69, 153–172 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-017-9749-4

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-017-9749-4

Search

Navigation