Crime, Law and Social Change

, Volume 49, Issue 2, pp 119–138 | Cite as

Toward a clean government in China: does the budget reform provide a hope?

  • Jun Ma
  • Xing Ni


Fighting corruption has proven to be a difficult task in many countries. In this paper, using China as a case study, we argue that a properly designed budgetary institution helps remove many institutional incentives and opportunities for corruption in financial management and regulatory activities of the government. As a result of recent budget reforms, China’s anticorruption effort has shifted from its earlier emphasis on exhortation and periodic crackdowns, which have been found to be ineffective, to the more fundamental issues of institutional incentives and opportunities for corruption. We propose that one consequence of the budget reform is the hope that China’s effort to create a clean government will be advanced. However, there is still a long way to go since it will take time for the new budgetary system to be institutionalized.


Government Budget Government Finance Budgetary Fund Organizational Corruption Corruption Control 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Center for Public Administration Research, School of GovernmentSun Yat-sen UniversityGuangzhouChina

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