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Crime, Law and Social Change

, Volume 49, Issue 2, pp 97–117 | Cite as

Old wine in new bottles: a county-level case study of anti-corruption reform in the People’s Republic of China

  • Hon S. Chan
  • Jie Gao
Article

Abstract

This paper examines the role of the target-based responsibility system for building upright Party style and clean government in combating corruption in local China. It argues that the effectiveness of the target-based responsibility system in corruption control is compromised by a number of implementation hurdles in practice. Based on a close examination of one county, Shaanxi Province in the northwest China, this study shows that low measurability of the targets, the conflict between anti-corruption work and other evaluation targets, and the impact of patronage politics account for the implementation failure of the target-based responsibility system. The fundamental problem lies in that under China’s unified cadre personnel management system, political will can interfere with the handling of corruption on a case-by-case basis, no matter what kind of anti-corruption mechanism is employed. Under this context, the adoption of the target-based responsibility system in fighting corruption results in nothing more than “pouring old wine into new bottles.”

Keywords

Moral Education Corrupt Behavior Party Committee Corruption Case Corruption Control 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Public and Social AdministrationCity University of Hong KongKowloonChina

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