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Federalism as a Public Good

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Abstract

This paper suggests that stabilizing federalism is like solving a public good provision problem. It reviews results in the public good provision literature that are relevant for federalism, and discusses the implications of these results for the institutional design of federalism.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, USA

    Jenna Bednar

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  1. Jenna Bednar
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Correspondence to Jenna Bednar.

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JEL classification: H110, H770, P160

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Bednar, J. Federalism as a Public Good. Constit Polit Econ 16, 189–205 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-005-2235-5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-005-2235-5

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