Constitutional Political Economy

, Volume 16, Issue 2, pp 189–205 | Cite as

Federalism as a Public Good

  • Jenna Bednar


This paper suggests that stabilizing federalism is like solving a public good provision problem. It reviews results in the public good provision literature that are relevant for federalism, and discusses the implications of these results for the institutional design of federalism.

Key words

Intergovernmental relations government performance institutional design 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Political ScienceUniversity of MichiganUSA

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