Properties of voting with veto power
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The article investigates a game-theoretical model with veto power in application to the election of the chairman of the board in a corporation. Alternative voting rules are considered, the most interesting being open voting in a specified order. Conditions are determined when voter 1 can ensure the election of his candidate. A complete solution is obtained for three voters, both in the case of strict preferences and in the case when the preferences of voters 2 and 3 are incompletely defined (contain an uncertainty). The latter case is particularly relevant because it arises for several decision-making rules and is an inseparable part of the real-life election process, when the voters represent several interest groups.
KeywordsPayoff Function Vote Rule Strict Preference Veto Power Voter Preference
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