Upper-bound estimates for the average probabilities of integer differentials of round functions of certain block ciphers
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The upper bounds for the average probabilities of integer round differentials are obtained for the composition of key adder, substitution block, and shift operator of special structure. The parameters on which these estimates depend and the conditions that minimize these estimates are determined. The statistical distribution of these parameters is obtained.
Keywordsblock cipher difference cryptanalysis integer differentials
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