Upper-bound estimation of the average probabilities of integer-valued differentials in the composition of key adder, substitution block, and shift operator
- 22 Downloads
The upper bounds for average probabilities of integer-valued round differentials are obtained for the composition of key adder, substitution block, and shift operator. Statistical distributions are obtained for parameters on which the probabilities depend.
Keywordsnon-Markov block ciphers integer-valued differential cryptanalysis
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- 1.National Institute of Standards and Technology: The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) (http://csrc.nist.gov/aes/).
- 2.State Standard GOST 28147-89. Information Processing Systems. Cryptographic Protection. Cryptographic Transformation Algorithm [in Russian], Gosstandart SSSR, Moscow (1989).Google Scholar
- 3.I. D. Gorbenko, O. S. Totskii, and S. V. Kaz’mina, “Advanced block cipher “Kalina:” Main principles and specifications,” Prikl. Radioelektr., 6, No. 2, 195–208 (2007).Google Scholar
- 4.I. D. Gorbenko, M. F. Bondarenko, V. I. Dolgov, et al., “Advanced block cipher “Mukhomor:” Main principles and specifications,” Prikl. Radioelektr., 6, No. 2, 147–157 (2007).Google Scholar
- 5.L. Kovalchuk and A. Alekseyshuk, “Upper bounds of maximum value of average differential and linear characteristic probabilities of Feistel cipher with adder modulo 2n,” Theory Stoch. Processes, 12(28), No. 1, 2, 20–32 (2006).Google Scholar
- 6.L. V. Kovalchuk, “Upper bounds of average probabilities of differential approximations of Boolean mappings,” in: Proc. 4th All-Russian Sci. Conf. “Mathematics and Safety of Information Technologies” (MaBIT-05), 23 Nov. 2005, MGU, Moscow (2005), pp. 163–167.Google Scholar
- 7.L. V. Kovalchuk, “Generalized Markov ciphers: Estimate of practical strength against differential cryptanalysis method,” in: Proc. 5th All-Russian Sci. Conf. “Mathematics and Safety of Information Technologies” (MaBIT-06), 25–27 Oct. 2006, MGU, Moscow (2006), pp. 595–599.Google Scholar
- 8.A. M. Oleksiichuk, L. V. Kovalchuk, and S. V. Palchenko, “Cryptographic parameters of substitution nodes that characterize the strength of GOST-like block ciphers with respect to linear and differential cryptanalysis methods,” Zakhyst Informatsii, No. 2, 12–23 (2007).Google Scholar
- 9.A. N. Alekseichuk, L. V. Kovalchuk, A. S. Shevtsov, and L. V. Skrypnik, “Estimates of practical strength of the block cipher “Kalina” with respect to difference, linear, bilinear cryptanalysis methods,” in: Proc. 7th All-Russian Sci. Conf. “Mathematics and Safety of Information Technologies” (MaBIT-08), 30 Oct–2 Nov. 2008, MGU, Moscow (2008), pp. 15–20.Google Scholar
- 10.A. N. Alekseichuk, L. V. Kovalchuk, E. N. Skrynnik, and A. S. Shevtsov, “Estimates of practical strength of the block cipher “Kalina” with respect to methods of differential, linear cryptanalysis and algebraic attacks based on homomorphisms,” Prikl. Radioelektronika, No. 1, 203–210 (2008).Google Scholar
- 12.X. Wang and H. Yu, “How to break MD5 and other hash functions,” Adv. Cryptology, EUROCRYPT’05, Lect. Notes Comput. Sci., 3494, Springer-Verlag, Berlin (2005), pp. 19–35.Google Scholar
- 13.S. Cotini, R. L. Riverst, M. J. B. Robshaw, and Lisa Yin Y., “Security of the RC6TM block cipher,” (http//www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/rc6/).
- 14.T. A. Berson, “Differential cryptanalysis mod 232 with applications to MD5,” Adv. Cryptology, CRYPTO’98, Lect. Notes Comput. Sci., 372, Springer-Verlag, Berlin (1999), pp. 95–103.Google Scholar