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The Nature of the Firm, Agency Theory and Shareholder Theory: A Critique from Philosophical Anthropology

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Abstract

Standard accounts on the nature of the firm are highly dependent on explanations by Coase, coupled with inputs from agency theory and shareholder theory. This paper carries out their critique in light of personalist and common good postulates. It shows how personalist and common good principles create a framework that not only accommodates business ethics better but also affords a more compelling understanding of business as a whole.

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Correspondence to Joan Fontrodona.

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Joan Fontrodona is Assistant Professor of Business Ethics and Academic Director of the Center for Business in Society at IESE Business School. He is member of the Academic Board of EABIS and member of the Executive Committee of EBEN-Spain.

Alejo José G. Sison is the Rafael Escolá Chair of Professional Ethics (TECNUN) with appointments from the Philosophy Department and the Institute of Enterprise and Humanism of the University of Navarra.

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Fontrodona, J., Sison, A.J.G. The Nature of the Firm, Agency Theory and Shareholder Theory: A Critique from Philosophical Anthropology. J Bus Ethics 66, 33–42 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-006-9052-2

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